I. INTRODUCTION
Emissions markets are an economically preferred and broadly accepted approach to implementing environmental regulations. This acceptance is primarily due to the widely hailed success of the U.S. sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) market under the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program (Ellerman et al. 2000; Joskow, Schmalensee, and Bailey 1998) . Building on this success, a nitrogen oxides (NO x ) market was introduced in 19 eastern states in 2003, and the European Union's Emission Trading System (EU ETS) established a carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) market as the centerpiece of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol climate treaty in 2005. A CO 2 market also began in the northeastern United States in 2008, and one is scheduled to begin in California in 2012. Emissions markets-or cap-and-trade programs-are the "grand" policy experiments of environmental regulation (Kruger and Pizer 2004; Stavins 1998) . A key component of any emissions market is the temporal dimension of trading and use, including opportunities to borrow or bank permits through time (Tietenberg 2006) . Flexible intertemporal trading allows firms to minimize pollution abatement costs over time. However, the additional flexibility from intertemporal trading can lead to hotspots-short periods with high emissions-which may lead to high damage costs for some pollutants. While banking and borrowing have been widely studied (Cronshaw and Kruse 1996; Rubin 1996; Kling and Rubin 1997; Schennach 2000; Yates and Cronshaw 2001) , capand-trade programs have begun to limit intertemporal trading in ways that have not been studied.
We study limited intertemporal trading in one of the longest-running emissions markets, the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM). Begun in 1994, RECLAIM established tradable permits for NO x and SO 2 emissions as part of a program to reduce smog in the Los Angeles air basin. A unique feature of RECLAIM-that permits and polluting facilities are assigned to one of two overlapping cycles, with trading allowed across cyclescreates opportunities for intertemporal trade. Early summaries of the program noted that the overlapping cycles were designed to prevent price spikes (Carlson et al. 1993) and to avoid insufficient liquidity in the market at the end of a compliance cycle (e.g., Carlson and Sholtz 1994) . More recently, Ellerman, Joskow, and Harrison (2003) observed that the overlapping cycles allow "limited temporal flexibility." 1 However, overlapping cycles and intertemporal trading have not been analyzed formally or comprehensively for the RE-CLAIM program or other programs with limited forms of permit banking or borrowing. 2 We investigate the theoretical and empirical implications of RECLAIM's overlapping cycles with three research questions. What are the equilibrium properties of the intertemporal market for RECLAIM permits? Can the program achieve cost-effective abatement? Are the empirical results consistent with predictions derived from the theoretical market equilibrium?
In the theoretical model of the intertemporal RECLAIM market, regulated firms are assigned to one of two compliance cycles. The firms minimize discounted pollution abatement costs and permit costs while meeting annual compliance requirements with valid permits of either cycle. We characterize the market's competitive equilibrium and derive results on cost-effectiveness, invariance of the equilibrium to parameter changes, delayed abatement, and the intertemporal pattern of prices. The model clarifies the opportunities for intertemporal arbitrage that arise from the two overlapping cycles. The theoretical analysis is necessary here because the RECLAIM market is distinct from prototypes of either a static permit market (Montgomery 1972) or a dynamic permit market (Cronshaw and Kruse 1996; Rubin 1996; Schennach 2000) . Like prior dynamic analyses, our competitive equilibrium has characteristics similar to the equilibrium in an exhaustible resource market.
Using data on permits and emissions from all RECLAIM facilities from 1994 through mid-2006, we evaluate several theoretical predictions of the model. First, using aggregate data, we ask whether firms used all of the permits of each vintage, as predicted by the 1 In contrast, Schwarze and Zapfel (2000) claim that "RECLAIM does not provide for any kind of inter-temporal trading" when comparing RECLAIM to the SO 2 allowance market.
2 Unrestricted banking was ruled out under RECLAIM "because of concerns that the ability to use banked emissions might lead to substantial increases in actual emissions in some future year, and thus delay compliance with ambient air quality standards" (Ellerman, Joskow, and Harrison 2003, 21). model, focusing on the years in which the program was clearly binding. We verify that firms do indeed trade across cycles. Second, using data on facility emissions, we use differencein-differences estimators to test two predictions: whether facilities delay abatement and whether there are no differences in emissions across compliance cycles. 3 The model and results are useful for understanding the role of overlapping permit cycles in other cap-and-trade programs including those regulating greenhouse gas emissions. The EU ETS, through its allocation and compliance provisions (Convery and Redmond 2007) , 4 allows for unlimited borrowing of allowances from the next year's allocation for compliance in the current year. Similarly, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)-a 10-state consortium in the northeastern United States-allocates permits on an annual basis, yet defines a three-year compliance period. This effectively allows for borrowing (RGGI 2007) , as future allocations can cover current emissions. 5 In addition, the U.S. Renewable Fuels Standard allows a "deficit carryover" under certain conditions, which allows for borrowing from the next year's production of renewable fuels. 6 In gen- 3 In related research, Fowlie, Holland, and Mansur (2009) investigate the level and spatial pattern of emissions under RECLAIM; Fowlie and Perloff (2008) test for a causal relationship between the initial allocation of permits and emissions at RECLAIM facilities; and Kolstad and Wolak (2003) develop evidence supporting the hypothesis that electricity generators used RECLAIM permit prices to exercise market power in the California electricity market.
4 "Borrowing is allowed as allowances for each year are to be issued before February 28, while compliance for the previous year is assessed after April 30. This allows de facto borrowing" (Convery and Redmond 2007, 96) . Trotignon and Ellerman (2008) develop evidence of both borrowing and banking in the EU ETS during 2005-2007. 5 Legislative proposals in the U.S. Congress for national cap-and-trade programs for greenhouse gases also provide for unlimited borrowing of allowances from the next year's allocation. The proposals include the American Power Act (introduced by Senators Kerry and Lieberman, at http:// kerry.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/APAbill3.pdf) and the American Clean Energy and Security Act (introduced by Representatives Waxman and Markey, at http://frwebgate. access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname = 111_cong_bills &docid = f:h2454eh.txt.pdf).
6 See "Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program; Final Rule" available at www.epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/regulations.htm. eral, permit borrowing effectively creates overlapping permit cycles; analysis of such cycles is a key feature of our study.
II. THE RECLAIM PROGRAM

Basic Features
The RECLAIM program established a capand-trade program for NO x and SO 2 in the Los Angeles air basin beginning January 1, 1994. The region has consistently suffered some of the worst smog in the United States (SCAQMD 1994). RECLAIM's original goal was to comply, by 2003, with the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ground-level ozone and particulates. The program thus defined steadily decreasing caps for NO x and SO 2 emissions. 7 The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) administers the program. 8 The program defines a RECLAIM Trading Credit (RTC) as the tradable emissions permit. 9 One RTC entitles the owner to emit one pound of pollution within a 12-month interval. Two types of RTCs exist-NO x and SO 2 -and thus two distinct markets operate in the program. The SO 2 market is relatively thin (Gangadharan 2000) , so our analysis focuses on the NO x market. The regulated entity under RECLAIM is a pollution-emitting facility. Initial allocations of RTCs were distributed free of charge to facilities. Over 300 facilities have used NO x RTCs in each year of the program. A single firm operates more than one facility in some cases.
A key feature of RECLAIM is its two overlapping cycles. Roughly equal numbers of facilities are assigned to each of the two compliance cycles. Facilities in compliance 7 Even with the 75% reduction in the NO x cap by 2007, the region continued to exceed the NAAQS ozone standard (USEPA 2007) . Program amendments in 2005 therefore required an additional 2,800 tons of reductions (about 25% below the 2007 cap) between 2007 and 2011. 8 The regulatory rules for the RECLAIM program are available at the SCAQMD web site (SCAQMD 2007) . These rules are the source for much of the program information reported here. 9 We use "permit" when developing or describing the theoretical model and "RTC" when specifically describing RECLAIM permits.
Cycle 1 complete their 12-month cycle at the end of the calendar year (December 31), while facilities in compliance Cycle 2 complete their 12-month cycle at the end of the fiscal year (June 30). RTCs allocated to Cycle 1 facilities are valid from January 1 through December 31. RTCs allocated to Cycle 2 facilities, in contrast, are valid from July 1 through June 30. Every facility then can comply using valid permits of either cycle. 10 For example, Cycle 1 firms can purchase and use Cycle 2 RTCs for compliance, although the RTCs remain subject to the Cycle 2 time limit. Cycle 2 firms can do likewise. We refer to the staggered cycles as the overlapping compliance cycles and overlapping permit cycles features of the program. 11 A cycle thus serves as a characteristic of both a facility and an RTC. These two characteristics are separable in principle. Carlson and Sholtz (1994) recognize this by noting that facilities could have received a "mixed allocation" of RTCs of each cycle, and Carlson et al. (1993) analyze these characteristics separately. However, the characteristics are linked in RECLAIM. Each Cycle 1 facility is allocated only Cycle 1 RTCs and, as well, must demonstrate compliance on a calendar year basis in each year. A Cycle 2 facility operates similarly.
RECLAIM likely adopted overlapping permit cycles to increase flexibility and allow firms to respond better to shocks. 12 Moreover, Carlson et al. (1993) provide experimental evidence that the permit cycles prevent price 10 To comply successfully, the number of its valid RTCs that a facility relinquishes to SCAQMD must equal its annual emissions.
11 The program also defines two spatial zones, coastal and inland. Due to the natural drift of smog from west to east, spatial trading from the inland zone to the coastal zone could exacerbate pollution. RTCs allocated to facilities in the coastal zone thus can be traded to cover emissions in the inland zone, but not vice versa. Gangadharan (2004) shows that, as expected, the price of a coastal-zone RTC is higher on average than the price of an inland-zone RTC.
12 According to Carlson and Sholtz (1994) overlapping permit cycles "remove the constraints that create difficulties arising from lagged emissions reports, unexpected business swings, and other insurance-inducing behaviors." spikes. 13 The rationale for overlapping compliance cycles is less clear. Carlson et al. (1993) note that overlapping compliance cycles may ease the administrative burden but will not "avoid market imbalances and economic inefficiencies." The RECLAIM program includes a monitoring requirement, 14 a reporting protocol, and a penalty structure for excess emissions. All facilities report emissions as part of a process known as Quarterly Certification of Emissions. Each facility then files an Annual Permit Emissions Program (APEP) report 60 days after the compliance year ends. This report, which reconciles emissions with RTCs, should be audited annually by RECLAIM, but audits were frequently delayed especially in the early years of the program. The penalty structure for excess emissions ("exceedances") is defined as an RTC quantity, a discretionary monetary fine, and discretionary 13 Ishikida et al. (2001) experimentally analyze different auction mechanisms for allocating RTCs. See Cason (2008) for a discussion of the use of experimental economics in the design of emissions trading programs including RECLAIM.
14 A regulated NO x facility is classified as a major source, a large source, or a NO x process unit. A major source must use a continuous emissions monitoring system (or another system with equivalent accuracy). A large source has the option, instead, to install a continuous process monitoring system. A process unit can be monitored manually by a fuel meter or other device.
limitations on the facility's ability to operate. A facility's allocation is reduced 1:1 by the amount of the excess in the year subsequent to the determination; this is referred to as an "exeedance deduction." A fine can also accompany the deduction, although SCAQMD can negotiate the amount of fine, subject to limitations within the RECLAIM regulations and California state laws. The penalty structure also provides for the authority to impose additional RTC conditions that specify requirements to prevent future exceedances.
Performance 15
One perspective on the RECLAIM program comes from examining, at an aggregate level, RTC allocations and usage over time. 16 Figure 1 shows the total number of RTCs of each vintage, based on their dates of expiration. The temporal declines in the initial allocations and available RTCs reflect the RECLAIM program's goal of reducing emis- 15 For comprehensive evaluations of RECLAIM, see Fowlie, Holland, and Mansur (2009) and the annual RE-CLAIM Audit Reports, available at the district's web site. USEPA (2002 USEPA ( , 2006 and Harrison (2004) also provide descriptions and evaluations of the program.
16 Facility-level data on RTC holdings, compliance, transactions, and emissions came from a public records request to the SCAQMD.
sions. The figure also shows the number of RTCs of each cycle used by facilities to cover their emissions.
In the figure, the initial allocations are the RTCs initially given to the facilities, and available RTCs are all permits available for the facilities to cover emissions. These can differ for three reasons. First, RTCs may be unavailable due to exceedance deductions. For example, 2.7 million RTCs expiring in December 1997 were deducted for prior exceedances. Second, RTCs can be created for a variety of mobile source credits. Through 2005, approximately 250,000 RTCs were created through this mechanism. Finally, RTCs were created and subsequently subtracted under an executive order and a mitigation fund in response to the California electricity crisis of 2000-2001. The RECLAIM market can be divided into three periods: 1994-1999, 2000-2001, and 2002-2006 . The first period's defining characteristic is a nonbinding cap at the aggregate level (Figure 1 ). The nonbinding cap was set intentionally to test whether the program, indeed, could be implemented successfully (Tietenberg 2006) . However, the excess supply meant that the decline in available RTCs did not lead to an equivalent reduction in emissions. Not surprisingly, average prices for current NO x RTCs were very low during this period: $154 per ton in 1996; $227 per ton in 1997; and $451 per ton in 1998.
Although prices were low, market activity appeared robust in the program's early years. Klier, Mattoon, and Prager (1997) found that roughly half the facilities participated in the RTC markets during 1995. Gangadharan (2000) assessed the factors that affected a facility's decision to trade or not in 1995 and 1996 and argued that trading begets trading, that is, the probability that a facility trades increases if the facility traded previously. Gangadharan (2004) also assessed the factors that affected RTC prices. Institutional features, type of seller (broker or facility), and year of transaction explain price levels.
Despite the robust market activity in the first period, substantial exceedance deductions occurred in the early years of the program, which did result in the gap noted above between allocations and available RTCs, especially in 1997 (Figure 1 ). One view of these exceedances is that the market was not functioning properly. An alternative view, supported by SCAQMD, is that these early violations were a result of learning about the new emissions market. 17 In either case, the exceedances were not very costly due to the excess supply of RTCs and hence their low price in this period.
RECLAIM's second period reflects crisis contagion: the perceived crisis in RECLAIM as a result of the California electricity crisis of [2000] [2001] . The number of RTCs used closely tracked the number of RTCs available during this period (Figure 1 ). The electricity crisis was characterized, in part, by enormous price spikes in the wholesale electricity market (Joskow 2001) . Faced with high prices amid summertime electricity demand, electricity generators in the Los Angeles region ramped up their output. Electricity generation at natural-gas-fueled plants is a major source of NO x emissions; generators thus were in a buying position on the NO x market. 18 RTC prices increased from about $3,000 per ton early in 2000 to nearly $20,000 per ton in June and on to about $70,000 per ton in August (Joskow and Kahn 2002 17 According to the SCAQMD, "In 1994, the main causes of exceedances were attributable to misunderstanding of the protocols. In 1995 and 1996, the main cause was the application of Missing Data Procedures" (see SCAQMD 1998, 5-4) . ators. 19 While many of these RTCs were later deducted from the market, not all were deducted: about 1 million new RTCs were injected into the market in this period. 20 SCAQMD also responded to the crisis with a RECLAIM amendment (Rule 2009) targeted at electricity generators. Under the rule, 14 major electricity generators were temporarily removed from the main market and could transact only with each other and the mitigation fund. 21 Their access to the main market was restored in 2007. These same generators were also required to install Best Available Retrofit Control Technology for NO x abatement. With the technology installed, the generators were in a position of excess supply of RTCs, yet they had no buyers due to the segmented market. In effect, SCAQMD adopted a command-and-control approach to regulating the generators as a response to high RTC prices. Since Rule 2009 clearly altered the incentives of these 14 facilities, we remove these facilities from portions of the descriptive and econometric analyses in Sections IV and V. 22 The third period of RECLAIM, 2002 through 2006, is a postcrisis transition period. Despite the segmented market, average market prices during this period for current-vintage RTCs were over $2,000 per ton in every year but 2004. These prices were much higher-over 10 times higher-than average prices during the early years of the program. Allocations and used RTCs followed a cyclical pattern during this period (Figure 1 ). This reflected the fact that the number of RTCs expiring in June exceeded the number expiring 19 These new RTCs are shown in Figure 1 as the difference between the initial allocation and the available RTCs. 20 An additional 100,000 RTCs expiring in December 2002 were injected as special mobile source credits. 21 The 14 facilities subject to Rule 2009 included AES (three facilities), City Of Burbank, El Segundo Power, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (four facilities), Long Beach Generation, Mountain Vista, Mountain View, Pasadena City, and Riverside Canal.
22 Forty-two facilities, emitting over 50 tons per year, were required to develop enforceable plans for compliance during -2005 under Rule 2009 .1. Since these facilities were never removed from the market, we include them in our later analysis.
in December, rather than reflecting an underlying seasonal variation in emissions. 23
III. A MODEL OF THE RECLAIM MARKET
The perfectly competitive model incorporates RECLAIM's four distinct features: (1) two annual overlapping permit cycles; (2) two annual overlapping compliance cycles for facilities, which coincide with the permit cycles; (3) tradable permits across facilities, although the permits are not bankable for future use; and (4) a decreasing allocation of permits each year. We label the facility compliance cycles as A and B but denote permit cycles by their expiration quarter. 24 Cycle A facilities are allocated the permits that are valid during the calendar year, while Cycle B facilities are allocated the permits that are valid during the fiscal year. Facilities can purchase and use permits of either cycle. The relevant unit of time under RECLAIM is the quarter year, as emissions reporting occurs, at a minimum, on a quarterly basis.
Competitive Equilibrium in the RECLAIM Model
To capture opportunities for intertemporal trading in the market, the RECLAIM model analyzes quarterly emissions subject to a capand-trade market with RECLAIM's distinct features.
Consider a representative facility in Cycle A. 25 Let be the facility's counterfactual A ε t (maximal) emissions in quarter and be A t a t 23 Little evidence exists on actual cost savings of the program relative to command-and-control regulation. Prior to its implementation, Johnson and Pekelney (1996) estimated that RECLAIM would reduce abatement costs by an average of $57.9 million per year relative to a commandand-control baseline (an average savings of 51 percent). Ellerman, Joskow, and Harrison (2003, 24) note that, "The high volume of trading in the RECLAIM program implies significant cost savings relative to the command-and-control alternative that it replaced, but no ex post estimates of these cost savings have been made."
24 Although the program labels the cycles as 1 and 2, we use A and B for notational ease. 25 The idea of a representative facility is a convenience to develop basic insights into incentives of a RECLAIM firm. The model is easily extended to heterogeneous firms. For a facility in Cycle A, the firm's problem is to choose the number of permits of each cycle to minimize the discounted sum of abatement costs and permit costs. 28 If the quarterly discount factor is , the firm's op-δ timization problem is
where . The first part
of this objective function is simply the discounted sum of abatement costs. The second and third terms of the objective function reflect the discounted costs of permit purchases; these terms incorporate the firm's choice between permits of different cycles. Since compliance is checked only in the fourth quarter for firms in Cycle A, is constructed such that i represents the fourth quarter of each t ‫ם‬ i year, and compliance costs are discounted by 26 The sequence for of corret {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,. .. } sponds to the sequence for of and ,4,4,4,8,8,8,8 . ,2,6,6,6,6,10,10,. . . } 27 To simplify notation, we suppress the compliance cycle of the facility in the demands. 28 At this point, the model abstracts from the initial allocation of permits to individual facilities. Initial allocations are addressed later in this section.
. Since the relevant opportunity cost of δt ‫ם‬ i permits is the price at time of compliance, the subscript on the prices is . The second t ‫ם‬ i term in the objective is the cost of permits expiring in quarter , that is, at the time of t ‫ם‬ i compliance. The final term in the objective is the cost of permits expiring in quarter t ‫ם‬ : either two quarters before the complii ‫ם‬ j ance period (for emissions in the first two quarters of the compliance year) or two quarters after the compliance period (for emissions in the last two quarters). For example, in the third quarter, if , the facility is one quarter t = 3 from its compliance period, so . The fai = 1 cility can use either permits that expire in Quarter 4 or permits that expire in Quarter 6, so, .
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for the firm's problem are
These conditions imply that if a firm demands a positive number of permits (in an interior solution), then the present value of the marginal abatement cost equals the present value of the marginal cost of a permit. However, if the present value of the marginal abatement cost is less than the present value of the price of the permits, then the firm will not demand any permits of that cycle. If abatement is less than counterfactual emissions, then
and/or , which implies that
words, discounted marginal abatement costs are equal to the lowest price of permits valid for emissions in that quarter. Note that in the compliance quarter (when and ), the i = 0 j = 2 marginal abatement cost is simply the price of the permit, namely, .
However, in other quarters the marginal abatement cost will in general differ from the permit price at the time of compliance by the relevant discount factor. The first-order conditions can be used to derive the demand correspondences for permits of each cycle for each quarter. For the facility in compliance Cycle A, let these demands be A and A , where de-
mands depend on , the infinite vector of all p time-dated prices for all permits, and the presubscript A denotes a facility in compliance Cycle A. 30 For the facility in compliance Cycle B, the firm's objective is
Note that compliance occurs in quarter t ‫ם‬ , using permits that expire in quarters i ‫ם‬ j and . The Kuhn-Tucker condi-
. These first-order conditions
can be used to construct the demand correspondences from Cycle B facilities for emissions permits in quarter : B and
The market (or aggregate) demand correspondences for permits of each cycle in each quarter are then found by adding together the demands from all facilities of both cycles. . In other words, if ar-
bitrageurs are to hold permits, the return on permits must be equal to the market rate of return, r. This arbitrage condition reduces the dimensionality of the price vector to the dimension of the number of markets. 32 The competitive equilibrium is now completely characterized by the arbitrage conditions, , by the facility
demands from [2] and [3] , by the aggregate demands found by summing the facility demands, and by equating the aggregate demands with the fixed supply of each type of permit.
The arbitrage condition has another interesting implication: discounted marginal abatement costs depend only on the premarket prices, or
The first equality follows from [2] and [3] , and the second equality follows from the arbitrage condition. A similar equation holds for Cycle B firms:
31 If there were T quarters, then we would have T/2 markets for permits, since permits expire semiannually. However, there would be T 2 /2 prices since each of the T/2 permits would have T time-dated prices.
32 Arbitrageurs can be either RECLAIM firms or non-RECLAIM firms.
These two equations imply that marginal abatement costs are equal across all firms, , for all t.
Extensions and Limitations of the Analysis
The model is readily extended to heterogenous abatement costs by simply indexing abatement costs by firms and summing appropriately. Extending the analysis to uncertain marginal abatement costs is less straightforward and is shown by Holland and Moore (2008) . There, the stochastic dynamic programming model shows that many of the properties of the competitive equilibrium extend. The main difference is that the Euler equation between periods and be- In this case, we have
This (Euler) inequality bounds marginal abatement costs in quarter
. If the abatet − 2 ment cost shock in quarter were favort − 2 able, it would be optimal to increase abatement in quarter and save additional t − 2 permits for use in quarters and . This t − 1 t implies that all permits need not be used in their first two quarters of validity, even in the symmetric stationary equilibrium.
An additional insight from the stochastic model comes if there is an excess supply of permits. Since the competitive equilibrium is cost-effective, it minimizes the number of unused permits. With uncertainty, the competitive equilibrium will additionally minimize the number of unused permits at each point in time. Intuitively, permits that expire later have 33 This condition holds in the symmetric stationary equilibrium and is consistent with the bounds established later in Result 4. higher option value. Thus, it is optimal to minimize unused permits at each point in time if there is some probability that the market will be binding in the life of the permits.
The model does not examine all market imperfections that have been identified in the literature. In particular, we do not analyze (1) asymmetric information about abatement costs between individual facilities and the regulator (see, e.g., Sappington and Stiglitz [1987] and Lewis [1996] for studies of this problem); (2) transaction costs of operating in the permit market (Stavins 1995; also, Ellerman, Joskow, and Harrison [2003] and USEPA [2002] conclude that transaction costs in RECLAIM are relatively low and trading is robust); and (3) incomplete program compliance in the model (see Sigman, in press ). Importantly, none of these limitations affect the main results of the analysis.
Illustration of the Equilibrium
To illustrate the equilibrium, assume first that abatement costs and permit supply are stationary. In addition, let firms and permit allocations be symmetric and equally distributed across the two cycles. In the stationary equilibrium, prices at the time of expiration are equal, that is, for all even . Note
that this implies that by the arbi-
trage condition. Since firms always use the cheaper permits (here, those that expire later) each permit is used exclusively in the first two quarters of its validity. Effectively, firms "borrow" permits from the future by using all permits in the first two quarters of their validity. This stationary equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2 , which shows permit prices of different vintages during the four quarters for which they are valid. In each quarter, there are two types of valid permits. In Figure 2 , prices are circled for which demand is positive. Since these are the equilibrium prices, demand for any type permit over the first two quarters of its validity must equal the supply of that type of permit. For example, the permits expiring in Quarter 8 (the Quarter 8 permits) are used in Quarters 5 and 6 by all firms including the firms of the opposite cycle. Note that the stationary equilibrium requires sub- stantial trading across cycles. Namely, all firms use permits of the opposite cycle (of which they received no initial allocation) for half of their emissions. We investigate this result empirically in Section V using data on permit use. A distinct feature of the RECLAIM program is the decreasing allocation of permits through time. We analyze this feature by considering a decrease in the supply of permits that expire in or after Quarter 10. If the decrease is small, the equilibrium shifts immediately to a new steady state with higher prices where again all permits are used in the first two quarters of their validity.
With a larger decrease, the equilibrium is more complicated. If the prices were to jump immediately to this new steady-state level, the prices of the Quarter 10 permits would be higher than the prices of Quarter 8 permits for quarters 7 and 8 and would be higher than the prices of Quarter 12 permits for Quarters 9 and 10. Thus there would be no demand for the Quarter 10 permits and, hence, excess supply. Furthermore, there would be excess demand for the Quarter 8 permits. The equilibrium price of the Quarter 8 permits must then be higher and the equilibrium price of the Quarter 10 permits must be lower. The resulting equilibrium is illustrated by Holland and Moore (2008, 35) .
The price of Quarter 8 permits increased in this equilibrium, although there was no change in the supply of these permits. Since this price increased, all of the Quarter 8 permits would not be used in the first two quarters of their validity. The unused permits are "banked" until the last two quarters of their validity to smooth the transition to the higherpriced steady state. Again in this higherpriced steady state, permits are "borrowed," that is, used in the first two quarters of their validity.
If the decrease in the supply of Quarter 10 permits were even larger, the prices of permits expiring earlier or later could be affected as well. For example, we could have 4
. In this case, the decrease 8 10 12 14
in permit supply after Quarter 10 increases marginal abatement costs in Quarter 2. Since all the Quarter 6 permits would not be used in their first two quarters of validity, some of these permits would be banked, as would the Quarter 8 and Quarter 10 permits. Here, the prices of Quarter 6 to Quarter 12 permits are equal in present value, in other words, the prices follow a Hotelling r-percent rule. RECLAIM initially had an excess supply of permits (nonbinding emissions caps). Holland and Moore (2008, 35) Quarter 12 permits are borrowed, as are all permits thereafter.
Results
We now state the results. All proofs are in Appendix A.
Result 1: Existence and efficiency. A competitive equilibrium exists. The competitive equilibrium is cost-effective but is not dynamically efficient.
As detailed in Appendix A, the existence of the equilibrium is a straightforward application of standard fixed-point arguments.
Cost-effectiveness requires that the facilities meet the emissions targets of the program at least cost. In particular, the equilibrium is cost-effective if it solves the constrained minimization problem where the objective function is the present value
abatement costs summed over all facilities i and all quarters t. The constraints, which are complicated here because of the overlapping cycles, reflect the emissions targets of the program. 34 Although the constrained cost minimization is complicated, the intuition of costeffectiveness is relatively straightforward. From [5] , all facilities in Cycle A set their discounted marginal abatement costs in quarter equal to the price of the cheapest applit cable permits. Thus marginal abatement costs 34 Intuitively, the constraints limit the sum of emissions in any four consecutive quarters so as to not exceed the unused permits valid for emissions in those four quarters.
are equal across all facilities in Cycle A. Facilities in Cycle B do the same. Although their compliance quarters are different, [5] shows that only premarket prices matter, so marginal abatement costs are equal across facilities in Cycle A and Cycle B in each quarter. Costeffectiveness also requires that abatement costs be minimized over time. The proof in Appendix A shows that any abatement vector that minimizes discounted abatement costs subject to the program constraints cannot have strictly lower costs than the equilibrium abatement costs.
Cost-effectiveness also follows as an application of the first welfare theorem. 35 In an exchange economy with some demand for some goods (emissions permits) and some endowments of the goods, the first welfare theorem says that a competitive equilibrium will allocate the goods to maximize social surplus. In the emissions-permit exchange economy, the equilibrium allocates the permits to maximize social surplus, that is, to minimize abatement costs. Note that the substitutability of the emissions permits across some quarters but not others does not constitute a market failure.
Dynamic efficiency does not hold, since firms have an incentive to delay abatement until the end of the compliance year, even if the regulator could set the number of permits such that annual marginal abatement costs could be equal to marginal damage costs. For example, if damage and abatement costs were stationary, then dynamic efficiency would require that abatement be equal in each quarter. However, from the first-order conditions for Quarters 1 and 2, we see that intertemporal trading in markets with bankable permits was first described by Kling and Rubin (1997) , who demonstrated that, like here, bankable and borrowable permits are cost-effective but not dynamically efficient. Although RECLAIM permits are not bankable across years, they are bankable within a year. This intrayear trading is one source of 35 The proof in Appendix A is a modification of a proof of the first welfare theorem presented by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995 Result 2a is a decentralization theorem. In the absence of any cost externalities across facilities, a firm minimizes total costs by minimizing costs in each of its facilities. This result is important for our empirical analysis since RE-CLAIM allocates permits and regulates emissions at the facility level, and one firm may own multiple facilities. The result shows that the model is applicable to our facility-level data.
Result 2b follows directly from [5] above. Since abatement is not affected by compliance time, switching a firm from one compliance cycle to the other does not affect emissions. This result is important for the empirical work since it implies that the assigned cycle should not have any predictive power for emissions.
Result 2c is a Coase theorem result. It follows directly from [5] since equilibrium marginal abatement costs do not depend on the initial allocation of permits. This result implies that, with entry, the market equilibrium is the same if entrants are allocated permits or if they must purchase permits, provided that the cap is the same.
Result 2d shows that, relative to annual compliance, a requirement of quarterly compliance does not affect firms' timing of emissions. This result is relevant since RECLAIM's original rules are unclear as to whether firms are required to comply quarterly or annually. The equilibrium is invariant to this. 
only the lower bound depends on permits being scarce. This result could be tested empirically if accurate data existed on marketclearing prices.
Result 5. Trading across cycles.
If facilities cannot use permits of each cycle, the equilibrium is not cost-effective.
Result 5 follows because if facilities cannot use permits of each cycle, arbitrage across the cycles cannot equate the marginal abatement costs of two facilities in different cycles. If marginal abatement costs are not equal, the same emissions reduction can be achieved at lower cost by increasing (decreasing) abatement from the facility with low (high) marginal abatement costs.
IV. DATA
Panel data on facility-level RTC holdings, compliance, and emissions for 1994-2006 come from a public records request to the SCAQMD. Additional data on product and input prices were collected from publicly available sources. This section initially focuses on the emissions data, as facility-level quarterly emissions serves as the dependent variable in the econometric analysis.
Given the overlapping validity of the RTCs, the used RTCs of different vintages cannot be directly compared to the underlying emissions. Figure 3 graphs the used RTCs of different vintages and the emissions aggregated to the half year to show that the two series are similar in magnitude. That semiannual emissions sometimes exceed permit usage does not suggest that the market was out of compliance, but rather that some other vintage of RTCs was used to cover these emissions. The figure also exhibits seasonal trends. Before 2000, semiannual emissions show a seasonal component but used RTCs do not. After 2000, on the other hand, used RTCs show a seasonal component but semiannual emissions do not. This suggests that the market had sufficient intertemporal trading to smooth seasonal shocks to emissions or different availability of RTCs across cycles.
To avoid complications stemming from the California electricity crisis, we sometimes isolate for analysis the subsample of facilities that were not subject to Rule 2009 (hereafter called the "Small Sample" of facilities). "Small" is a relative term here, in fact, as the number of facilities in the analysis decreases only from 556 to 542 in the Small Sample. Figure 4 illustrates facility-level mean quarterly emissions of this subsample by cycle. Importantly, this mean is generally declining over time and is not substantially different across the two compliance cycles. 36 As with the distribution of all facilities, this distribution is highly skewed and can be sensitive to outliers. 37 In the regressions, we identify the effects from within-facility variation.
Our analysis is also shaped by understanding when the market is binding, that is, when there are zero unused RTCs. As described earlier, the program was designed to operate with a nonbinding cap (excess supply) during the early years. However, in the later years, the models predict that all permits should be used, even with uncertain abatement costs. Thus we address two questions: Were all RTCs ever used completely? What subset of facilities completely used their RTCs at various points in time?
The reality is that the market never achieved the theoretical prediction of zero unused RTCs at the aggregate level. Even when 36 Since emissions from generators made up a larger proportion of total emissions in the early years of the program, a seasonal pattern appears in the early years of the program but is less pronounced in the later years. 37 For example, the drop in mean Cycle 2 emissions in the second quarter of 1998 does not occur in the median and, hence, is likely driven by outliers. Probably the best measure of the tightness of the market is thus the median number of unused RTCs, by facility. Table 1 analyzes the distribution of unused RTCs among our Small Sample of facilities. 39 The distribution is right-skewed with the median much lower than the mean. The maximum number of unused RTCs sometimes accounts for a substantial proportion of the total unused RTCs: for example, 25% of all unused December 2000 RTCs were held by a single facility. For nine vintages expiring after 1999, over half of the facilities had no unused RTCs. The 40th percentile has no unused RTCs for all vintages beginning with RTCs expiring in 1998. This suggests that a sizable proportion of the facilities used all their RTCs.
For our econometric analysis, the two phases of RECLAIM-years without a bind- 38 Per the USEPA (2006), the price of $7.50 per RTC was established by the program as a target for a backstop price, and Rule 2009 facilities were allowed to buy RTCs at this price; prices were much higher during the crisis, and at least one trade took place at $62 per RTC.
39 Appendix B contains a more extensive study of unused RTCs.
ing market and years with a binding marketcreate conditions for application of difference-in-differences estimators. We investigate two possible periods of a binding market, 2000-2002 and 2000-2006 . A binary variable Scarcity controls for these periods as a treatment. We also use quarterly data to develop eight variables to control for differences in marginal abatement costs, as follows. Initial allocation is in RTCs (pounds) and is the facility's annual allocation divided by four. Output price is a producer price index by North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code, matched by facility, for the United States. Interest rate is in percent for the 10-year Treasury note. Wage rate is average hourly earnings in dollars for the trade, transportation, and utility sectors for the United States. Actual temp is populationweighted actual temperature (weather) for the four-county Los Angeles area. Average temp is population-weighted average temperature (climate) for the four-county Los Angeles area for . Natural gas price is in dollars per thousand cubic feet for the commercial sector of California. Electricity price is in cents per kilowatt-hour for the commercial sector of California. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on all variables used in the regressions. [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . NO x emissions is in pounds. Initial allocation is in RTCs (pounds) and is the annual allocation divided by four. Output price is a producer price index by NAICS code, matched by facility, for the United States. Interest rate is in percent for the 10-year Treasury note. Wage rate is average hourly earnings in dollars for the trade, transportation, and utility sectors for the United States. Actual temp is population-weighted actual temperature (weather) for the four-county Los Angeles area. Average temp is population-weighted average temperature (climate) for the four-county Los Angeles area for . Natural gas price is in dollars per thousand cubic feet for the commercial sector of California. Electricity price is in cents per kilowatt-hour for the commercial sector of California. 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To analyze intertemporal trading, we begin with analysis of aggregate data on RTC supply and use: do model predictions on intertemporal trading hold in aggregate summary statistics on RTC allocations, trading, and usage? We then move to the econometric analysis of data on facility emissions to test for delayed abatement and trading across cycles.
Unfortunately, we cannot empirically test the other propositions. We cannot test for costeffectiveness since we have no data on marginal abatement costs. Also, we cannot test bounds on prices since Result 4 shows that either or .
Aggregate Analysis
The most basic indicator of intertemporal trading among facilities is whether facilities hold and use RTCs of the opposite cycle. All initial allocations match the compliance cycle of the individual facility, in other words, a facility in Cycle 1 is allocated only December RTCs. Facilities are then free to buy, sell, and use RTCs of either cycle. Recall that the stationary model predicts that facilities should use half of the RTCs of their own cycle and half of the opposite cycle.
We define matched and mismatched RTCs, where the RTCs are matched if the permit and facility have the same cycle but mismatched if the RTC and facility have the opposite cycle. For example, the initial allocation would be 100% matched. Mismatched RTCs are analyzed in Table 3 for all facilities (i.e., for both the Small Sample and the Rule 2009 electricity generators).
The first two columns of Table 3 address whether facilities purchase RTCs of the opposite cycle by analyzing their holdings of RTCs, namely, their allocations plus any net purchases. In the early years of the program, there was little trading across cycles: only about 10% of all holdings were mismatched. Given the excess supply of RTCs in the early years, facilities had little need to trade, let alone to trade across cycles. However, some firms did trade across cycles, which illustrates that the market rules were clear to the market participants. As the market tightened during and after the crisis, the aggregate number of mismatched holdings increased to about 30%, indicating substantial trading across cycles. 40 The third and fourth columns of Table 3 show the percentage of mismatched RTCs used to cover emissions. In the early years with excess supply of RTCs, the percentage of mismatched RTCs used was small but not zero. This again indicates that market participants were aware of the rules. Over time, the percentage of mismatched RTCs used for emissions increased to approximately 30% at the aggregate level. In the stationary, symmetric model, 50% of the used RTCs should be mismatched. 41 In sum, the simplest evidence of intertemporal trading is the purchase and use of mismatched RTCs. A substantial proportion of the RTCs held and used by the facilities are indeed mismatched. 
Econometric Analysis
The RECLAIM model derived a number of positive and normative results. Here we can test two of the positive predictions given the available data. The first is Result 3, that facilities should delay abatement. The second is Result 2b, that trading should equate marginal abatement costs across facilities with different compliance cycles. For both empirical tests, we use unique features of the program to control for unobservables.
The basic econometric strategy is the difference-in-differences (DID) framework. While we control for a rich set of observable facility characteristics, this approach also allows us to control for time-invariant unobservables. The approach is made possible by the initial period of excess supply of RTCs. With excess supply, permit prices are zero, and firms produce counterfactual emissions. When RTCs are scarce (no excess supply), a treatment is in place: the RECLAIM program incentives are binding and abatement is positive. The DID strategy uses the observed emissions with excess RTCs to control for time-invariant, unobservable differences in emissions when RTCs are scarce.
Delayed Abatement
Impatience and the time value of money give RECLAIM firms an incentive to delay abatement. This effect, stated precisely in Result 3, can be illustrated with the Euler equation:
, where is even.
Controlling for differences in the abatement cost function, if marginal abatement costs are strictly positive, then marginal abatement costs (and abatement) are higher in quarter t than in quarter . This implies that emist − 1 sions should be lower in quarter than in quart ter when RTCs are scarce, that is, when t − 1 the RECLAIM program is binding. Table B1 supports these definitions in its analysis of unused RTCs. The vector of controls, , cap-X it tures differences in marginal abatement costs across time and industry. The controls include logs of output price, interest rate, wage rate, natural gas price, electricity price, actual temperature (weather), average temperature (climate), and initial allocations. The facility fixed effects, , controls for time invariant ν i differences across facilities including any unobserved heterogeneity in marginal abatement cost. The vector of time dummy variables, , here 12-year effects and four-quarter ef-μ t fects, captures common changes 43 The dependent variable is logged since emissions are right-skewed. The percentage change is given by exp[β] -1, which is approximately β. 44 In the Small Sample, Scarcity t is not facility specific. In the full sample, the scarcity variable is facility specific (Scarcity it ) to account for the presence in the sample of Rule 2009 facilities and electricity generators. Scarcity it is never positive for the Rule 2009 facilities or for the electricity generators, but it is positive for the other facilities during the scarcity period. In the full sample, the regression controls for Scarcity it , and the coefficient of interest is on the interaction, which is now EvenQtr t *Scarcity it . 45 Note that the standard DID model would control for and Scarcity t as well as their interaction. Here EvenQtrt is a linear combination of the seasonal dummy EvenQtrt variables, and Scarcity t is a linear combination of the year dummy variables. over time and seasonal variation. The error term, , is allowed to be serially correlated. ε it The coefficient of interest, , captures the β percentage change in emissions for even quarters (quarters when some RTCs are expiring) relative to odd quarters during the period when RTCs were in scarce supply. If abatement is delayed, as in Result 3, the coefficient will be negative.
The estimated coefficients of interest and standard errors are presented in Table 4 for several model specifications. The first three columns present specifications where the scarcity period, , is defined from 2000-Scarcity t 2002, that is, when the market was clearly binding. As predicted by theory, the point estimates are generally negative, regardless of whether the sample includes the facilities affected by the crisis or whether additional controls are included. However, only one of the estimates is significantly different from zero.
The specification in the first column estimates a (insignificant) 2.3% reduction in emissions in later quarters due to delayed abatement. The second specification includes the generators and facilities subject to Rule 2009 as controls. Including these facilities as additional controls does not increase the precision of the relevant estimates. The third column adds the vector of eight control variables. This specification estimates a 4.6% reduction in late-quarter emissions due to delayed abatement, and the coefficient has a p-value of 10.4%. 46 Due to missing output prices and initial allocations of zero, the sample shrinks to 9,529 observations, which potentially makes this estimate biased by sample selection.
We gauge the potential bias by using two approaches to analyze the difference between the estimates in Columns 1 and 3. First, we estimate the model without the controls on the smaller sample with 9,529 observations in the specification, and find that the coefficient is similar. 47 Second, we estimate the model on the larger sample while allowing for a different coefficient for the smaller sample. We find that the coefficient is not significantly different from zero on the smaller sample. This test suggests that the estimation in Column 3 is preferable. However, the marginal significance of the coefficient and the larger standard error relative to Column 1 prevent us from drawing strong conclusions from the estimates.
The last three columns in the table define the Scarcity period over a longer time frame, 2000-2006, and yield very small point estimates for the coefficient of interest. Although the market should be binding for facilities in 46 Since our alternative hypothesis is < 0, a one-tailed β test is appropriate. Although a one-tailed test would have a p-value of 5.2%, we report the more conservative p-value from a two-tailed test. 47 The coefficient from estimating the model on the reduced sample without the price controls is − 0.062. the Small Sample in this time period, the number of unused RTCs began to increase above zero after 2002 (see Table 1 ), indicating a relaxation of the tightness of the market. If the market is not truly binding for all of this longer period, the regression suffers from measurement error, which biases the coefficients toward zero. The estimates-although positive-are indeed very close to zero.
Although theory predicts a negative coefficient, we do not expect to find a large coefficient. Consider a quarterly discount rate of 3% (reflecting an approximate annual rate of 12%); the arbitrage condition then predicts that the expected price of RTCs would rise by 3% per quarter. An estimated coefficient of − 0.03 would indicate a 3% reduction in emissions across quarters, which would be consistent with a marginal abatement cost with unitary elasticity.
Emissions across Cycles
Trading across compliance cycles at a point in time should equate marginal abatement costs across firms with different compliance cycles. Controlling for differences in the abatement cost function, emissions should also be equal, as demonstrated in Result 2b.
The DID framework could be used to test whether emissions are different across the cycles while using the emissions during the period of excess permit supply to control for time-invariant unobservables. However, an estimate of this effect would be nonzero only if the difference between emissions from Cycle A facilities were consistently lower or higher than emissions from Cycle B facilities. The theoretical model without trading across cycles, developed in Section III, shows that this is not the case: controlling for abatement costs, emissions from facilities in Cycle A should be higher than Cycle B emissions in the early quarters of compliance Cycle A, but should be lower than Cycle B emissions in the late quarters. Thus, even without trading across cycles, the differences in emissions should be zero on average.
We use the theory to construct a better estimator. If facilities do not trade across cycles, then the model predicts that emissions should be higher in the earlier quarters of the compliance cycles. Thus, instead of testing for differences in emissions across cycles, we test for differences in emissions across early versus late quarters of the compliance year. We define the indicator to equal one LateQtr it for the third and fourth quarters of the calendar year if the facility is in Cycle A, and to equal one for the first and second quarters of the calendar year if the facility is in Cycle B. 48 The DID estimator is then ln(e ) = α ‫ם‬ β LateQtr ‫ם‬ β LateQtr *Scarcity
[8]
The coefficient of interest, , captures the β 2 percentage change in emissions for quarters late in the compliance cycle relative to quarters early in the compliance cycle. If facilities trade across cycles, the coefficient will be zero. However, if they do not trade across cycles, the coefficient will be negative. 49 Results for several model specifications are presented in Table 5 . None of the coefficient estimates are statistically different from zero, which supports the theory. However, the large confidence intervals prevent us from drawing too strong a conclusion. For the preferred specifications in Columns 1 and 3, the 95% confidence intervals range from − 9% to 2% and − 11% to 4%. This implies that we can reject large differences across cycles but cannot reject smaller differences.
For the longer scarcity period defined from 2000 to 2006, the coefficients are generally smaller in magnitude, which is consistent with measurement error.
VI. CONCLUSION
Intertemporal tradability of permits is an important aspect of pollution permit market design. Motivated by the RECLAIM emissions trading program in Southern California, we study intertemporal permit trading in a market with overlapping cycles of permit va- 48 The variable is orthogonal to seasonal and LateQtr it quarter effects since it is positive for some facilities and zero for the remaining facilities in each quarter. 49 As above, the scarcity indicator will be facility specific in the full sample. Thus, we control for in Scarcity it the full sample. lidity. This is especially timely as overlapping permit cycles have become a common feature of cap-and-trade markets for greenhouse gas emissions.
The theoretical model captures the distinct intertemporal features of the RECLAIM market, namely, two overlapping permit cycles, two compliance cycles, tradable but not bankable permits, and decreasing annual permit allocations. We show that an equilibrium exists in the model and that it is cost-effective, although not necessarily dynamically efficient. The equilibrium is invariant to merging two firms, reassigning a firm from one cycle to the other cycle, reallocating the initial endowment of permits, or requiring the firms to verify compliance quarterly. In equilibrium, firms have an incentive to delay abatement, so emissions are higher in earlier periods if the same vintages of permits are used in the two periods. Finally, we show that the present value price of any vintage permit is bounded above and below by the present value prices of the permits expiring immediately before and after that vintage. Extending the model to uncertain abatement costs, we also show that firms always minimize the cumulative number of unused permits, since permits have no option value once they have expired.
We test several predictions of the theoretical model using data from RECLAIM on RTC allocation, trading, and use. With an aggregate analysis, we find mixed support for the model. Importantly, during the years when the RECLAIM program was clearly binding, the median number of unused RTCs held by facilities in the program was zero. In other words, over 50% of the facilities completely used or sold all their RTCs of each vintage before the RTCs expired. However, theory predicts that 100% of the facilities should completely use RTCs, and we find evidence that a few facilities held a substantial number of unused RTCs even of the most valuable vintages. Similarly, analyzing mismatched RTCs, we find that a substantial proportion of RTCs are held and used by facilities of the opposite cycle, in other words, firms do trade intertemporally.
Using quarterly data on facility emissions, two further predictions of the theoretical model are tested using a difference-in-differences estimator. First is the prediction of delayed abatement: We find negative point estimates for delayed abatement, which is consistent with the theoretical predictions. However, the estimates are either marginally significant or insignificant. Second is the prediction of differences in emissions across cycles: we do not reject no difference across cycles (as predicted by theory), but the confidence intervals are not small enough for us to draw a sharp conclusion. As with the aggregate analysis, we conclude that the econometric evidence provides weak, though inconclusive, support for the theory.
Delayed abatement due to time discounting is important for emissions markets with any form of borrowing. This is especially crucial for regulation of stock pollutants such as greenhouse gas emissions. Building on our research, additional study of various emissions markets is needed to understand whether firms follow this basic incentive for intertemporal cost minimization and whether equilibrium prices follow the predicted r-percent rule.
Our analysis leads us to draw several policy recommendations for intertemporal market design. Our first recommendation is that policy makers should broaden the consideration of market design beyond whether permits are bankable. Bankable permits generally have no final date of validity. By fixing a final date of validity for permits, regulators can limit the size of any unused bank of permits, thus avoiding potential pollution hot spots or, more generally, noncompliance with an air quality standard. This is an especially important consideration for pollutants with rapidly increasing marginal damage costs. At the same time, a limitation of permits with a terminal date of validity is that they have zero opportunity cost at their expiration date. This may, counterintuitively, increase pollution in the early years.
Second, since the arbitrage condition guarantees that compliance dates or cycles do not affect the equilibrium, firms should not be assigned to different compliance "cycles." RECLAIM's overlapping compliance cycles and assignment of facilities to one of two compliance cycles-probably done to ease the administrative burden-likely only contributed to confusion. We recommend instead that compliance take place as frequently as possible for each facility. If larger facilities are reporting emissions hourly, there is no reason that permits cannot be deducted daily or weekly from their accounts of unused permits. Similarly, if smaller facilities report quarterly, permits can be deducted from their accounts quarterly. More frequent compliance has the advantages of smoothing regulators' work load, making firms more cognizant of their permit balances, and making regulators quickly aware of any shortfalls in permit balances.
Finally, we recommend that each facility receive an initial allocation of all vintages of permits that are valid for its emissions. RECLAIM allocated only Cycle 1 RTCs to Cycle 1 facilities, even though these facilities could use either Cycle 1 or Cycle 2 RTCs. Although most firms learned that they could use either cycle of RTCs, giving them an initial allocation of RTCs of both cycles would have removed any ambiguity.
Despite the positive prices for RTCs, a substantial number of permits were not used for compliance in 2002-2006 (after the California electricity crisis). This suggests friction in the market along the lines of transaction costs or administrative inefficiency in the operation of facilities and firms. Future research is needed to discern whether systematic patterns of firm behavior can explain the unused permits. For example, are firms in particular sectors or of particular sizes more likely to let RTCs go unused, and why?
Regulators have a great deal of flexibility in designing intertemporal trading rules for pollution permit markets, and most firms respond optimally to these rules. Careful market design, such as overlapping cycles of permits, can increase the intertemporal efficiency of pollution markets while avoiding the potential problems of bankable permits.
APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF RESULTS
Result 1
Existence follows from standard fixed point arguments. Importantly, the demand correspondences are upper hemicontinuous. Since demand is zero when the price is higher than that of the substitute permit, equal to the marginal abatement cost when the price is below the price of the substitute permit, and any amount in between when the price is equal to the price of the substitute permit, the demand correspondences also have convex images. Existence follows from Kakutani's fixed point theorem.
To show cost-effectiveness, consider abatement, a*, the vector of equilibrium abatement by each firm at each time, and a, the abatement vector that minimizes abatement costs subject to the program constraints, namely, which is cost-effective. Suppose that a has strictly lower abatement costs than a*, that is, . Strictly lower Table B1 also illustrates the number of unused RTCs held by traders, by Rule 2009 facilities, and by facilities in our Small Sample. Prior to the tightening of the market, traders held a large proportion of the unused RTCs. This is not surprising if many facilities sold/transferred RTCs that they clearly wouldn't need to traders in hopes of finding some facility that would pay for them. However in the tight market and thereafter, traders generally held a small (but not zero) proportion of unused RTCs. 55 The facilities subject to Rule 2009 held a large proportion of the unused RTCs after the crisis, perhaps not surprisingly given that these facilities were required to install NO x abatement technology and were excluded from the main market. Over half of the unused RTCs expiring after June 2002 were held by these 14 facilities. For the remaining facilities, those in the Small Sample category, there was no prohibi-tion against trading. However, these facilities continued to hold a significant number of unused RTCs.
We also investigated whether the distinction between coastal and inland RTCs played a role in explaining unused permits but found no pattern.
To summarize, facilities held unused RTCs, many of which can be explained by the excess initial allocations in RECLAIM's early years or by the market segmentation in response to the crisis. On the other hand, a substantial proportion of the facilities not subject to trading prohibitions had no unused RTCs: over 40% percent had zero unused RTCs expiring after 1999. This suggests that the facilities not subject to trading restrictions (although not all such facilities) were using all RTCs as predicted by theory.
